Substitution Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d):
Mootness and Related Problems
Although private suits against the government may be barred
by the doctrine of sovereign immunity,' it has long been recognized
that in certain circumstances a private litigant may seek equitable
relief "intrinsically against the government" by naming a government officer as defendant.' These cases present particular difficulties when the named defendant, for whatever reason, leaves office
during the course of the litigation and is succeeded. At common law,
a successor could not be substituted as defendant in a suit that had
been brought against the predecessor in his official capacity unless
a statute or court rule permitted the substitution;' the action was
said to abate.4 A plaintiff thwarted by a succession in office would
thus have to begin the litigation anew in order to acquire the desired
relief.5 Since the subsequent suit generally involved the relitigation
of numerous issues,' the abatement doctrine has been widely and
properly criticized for causing the waste of both judicial and per7
sonal resources.
1

See generally 3 K. DAvis,
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§§ 27.01-27.05, 27.09 (1958).

E.g., Philadelphia Co. v. Steinson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908). See generally Davis, Sovereign Immunity in Suits Against Officers for Relief Other
than Damages, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 3 (1954); Block, Suits Against Officers and the Sovereign
Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REv. 1060 (1946).
3 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bernadin v. Butterworth, 169 U.S. 600 (1898); United
States v. Boutwell, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 604 (1873).
The term "successor" includes any government official who succeeds to the powers of the
defendant named in the original action. Thus, if the defendant's office is abolished but its
powers are transferred to another department, the officer who succeeds to those powers is a
"successor." The courts have typically treated such transfers as successions for the purpose
of applying a substitution statute. E.g., Wright v. County School Board, 309 F. Supp. 671
(E.D. Va. 1970), rev'd on othergrounds sub nom., Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 442
F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Jackson v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 317
F. Supp. 1151 (M.D. Fla. 1970); accord, Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331
U.S. 111 (1947).
Abatement means dismissal of the action without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff
to bring a similar action against the successor in office at a later time. Cf. Acheson v. Furusho,
212 F.2d 284, 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1954).
5 A succession did not, of course, abate a suit seeking money damages from the predecessor personally. As a logical matter, the predecessor's separation from office has no effect on
the litigation.
I The only new issue likely to arise would be whether the successor had repeated the
conduct originally challenged.
7 See, e.g., Irwin v. Wright, 258 U.S. 219, 224 (1922); United States ex rel. Bernadin v.
2
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The abatement doctrine in cases involving the succession of
public officers has been eliminated under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 25(d)(1) provides that a successor is to be automatically substituted in a suit pending against his predecessor., Automatic substitution does not, however, resolve all of the problems
created by a succession in office. Rule 25(d) substitution is purely
procedural;9 the litigation can continue only if, as a matter of substantive law, the controversy survives the substitution. 0 In other
words, even though a succession in office will no longer abate a
controversy, it may effectively moot the suit and compel a dismissal.
The problem of mootness in rule 25(d) cases is particularly
acute when the plaintiff seeks to enjoin a government officer from
continuing to engage in a certain course of conduct." When substitution occurs in such a case for injunctive relief in futuro, critical
importance attaches to the allocation of the burden of proof on the
Butterworth, 169 U.S. 600, 605 (1898). See generally 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAIcE
25
(2d ed. 1974); Comment, Abatement-Status of Suit Nominally Against Government Official
When Official Leaves Office, 50 MicH. L. REV. 443, 445 (1952); Davis, Suing the Government
by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 451 (1962); Note,
Developments in the Law: Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 HARv.
L. REv. 829, 831-34 (1957); Comment, Abatement for Failure to Make Proper Substitution, 5
MiAMi L.Q. 611, 612 (1951).
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 25(d) provides:
(1) When a public officer is a party to an action in his official capacity and during its
pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action does not abate and
his successor is automatically substituted as a party. Proceedings following the substitution shall be in the name of the substituted party, but any misnomer not affecting the
substantial rights of the parties shall be disregarded. An order of substitution may be
entered at any time, but the omission to enter such an order shall not affect the substitution.
(2) When a public officer sues or is sued in his official capacity, he may be described
as a party by his official title rather than by name; but the court may require his name
to be added.
Rule 25(d)(1) was amended in 1961 to eliminate the necessity of demonstrating, as a
condition of the substitution, that the successor intended to continue the predecessor's policies. See text and notes at notes 20-22 infra. The rules for the Supreme Court and the United
States Courts of Appeals contain equivalent provisions. Sup. CT. RULE 48(3); FED. R. ApP. P.
43(c).
I See Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 25(d) (1961) [hereinafter referred to as Note].
14As a purely procedural measure, rule 25(d) can have no impact on whether either
sovereign immunity or the eleventh amendment will be available bars. Rule 25(d) could not,
nor was it intended to, create liabilities that did not previously exist. 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACrICE T 25-404.
" Cases seeking such relief, often termed "injunctions in futuro," will be the focus of this
comment. Although rule 25(d) is intended to operate in a broader range of cases, see note 20
infra, the relief sought in those cases might pose special practical difficulties that call for
modifying the allocation of the burden of establishing mootness that is recommended herein.
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question of mootness. In Spomer v. Littleton,'2 the only Supreme
Court decision in which the effect of a rule 25(d) substitution has
played a central role, the Court remanded the case without adjudicating its merits in order to give the plaintiff-respondent an opportunity to demonstrate that the controversy had not been mooted by
succession.'" If, as in Spomer, all plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief
in futuro are required to establish that the controversy has not been
mooted by a substitution of named defendants, then the procedure
of rule 25(d) may be turned into an empty formality as inefficient
as the abatement doctrine. Requiring the defendant to prove mootness, on the other hand, would rarely generate inefficiency or injustice. Either the successor intends to continue the allegedly improper
conduct, in which case it is difficult to conclude that he is prejudiced by litigating the case sooner rather than later, or he intends
to discontinue the behavior, in which case he should be allowed to
moot the case by so declaring."4 At first glance, then, common sense
suggests the desirability of allocating the burden on the issue of
mootness to the successor in cases where the plaintiff has sought
injunctive relief against the predecessor in his official capacity.
After reviewing the history of federal substitution measures,
this comment examines amended federal rule 25(d)(1) and argues
that the rule was intended to place the burden of establishing mootness on the successor. Spomer and its progeny are then discussed
and it is argued that the result in Spomer-requiring the plaintiff
to establish non-mootness-is best understood as a narrow though
ill-defined exception to the general rule allocating the burden to the
successor. Finally, the comment argues that the principles underlying certain closely related and well established doctrines provide
further support for placing the burden of establishing mootness on
the successor, and suggests that this burden should be satisfied by
a good faith disavowal of the contested policy.
12 414

U.S. 514 (1974); see text and notes at notes 35-50 infra. See also Two Guys from

Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) in which rule 25(d) played a minor
role.
. On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the case was moot.
Littleton v. Berbling, No. 71-1395 (Jan. 15, 1975) (unpublished opinion not to be cited per

7TH Cm. R. 28).
" See text and notes at notes 99-100 infra. A difficult intermediate case arises when the
successor claims to have a good faith doubt concerning his intent to continue the challenged
behavior. It will be argued that the successor should be required either to disavow the policy
or defend its legality in the current suit since the likelihood of continued prejudice to the
plaintiff is solely within the successor's control. Id.
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I.

FEDERAL MEASURES GOVERNING SUBSTITUTION OF
SUCCESSOR OFFICERS

A.

Substitution Prior to 1961

United States v. Boutwell'5 firmly established in the United
States the common law rule that an action against a public officer
in his official capacity abates, in the absence of contrary statutory
authority, upon his separation from office during the pendency of
an action. Boutwell was an action seeking a writ of mandamus to
compel the Secretary of the Treasury to pay the amount due on
certain Treasury orders. During appeal of the denial of the writ, the
claimants unsuccessfully sought to substitute the successor to the
original named defendant. In affirming the result below, the Supreme Court conceded that the claimants might have been seeking
the satisfaction of an official and enduring governmental obligation
rather than a duty personal to the predecessor. Nevertheless, the
Court held that the action abated because the relief sought was
necessarily personal to the predecessor. The Court noted that the
successor was neither in privity with nor the agent of his predecessor
and, in essence, instructed the claimants to seek payment from the
successor before seeking judicial intervention."6
Because the abatement doctrine often forced private plaintiffs
to follow round-about procedures and tended to waste judicial resources, 7 the doctrine has been modified by various federal statutes
and court rules since 1899. None of the pre-1961 rules, however,
provided for automatic substitution, but instead conditioned substitution on a demonstration by the plaintiff that there was a need to
continue the action against the successor." Independent issues of
,184 U.S. (17 Wall.) 604 (1873). See also United States ex rel. Bernadin v. Butterworth,
169 U.S. 600 (1898); Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Smith, 165 U.S. 28 (1896); United States ex
rel. Warden v. Chandler, 122 U.S. 643 (1887).
"84 U.S. at 607.
,TThe Supreme Court recognized the need for statutory modification of the abatement
doctrine in United States ex rel. Bernadin v. Butterworth, 169 U.S. 600, 605 (1898), and then
again in Irwin v. Wright, 258 U.S. 219, 224 (1922).
11The 1899 Act, 30 Stat. 822 (1899), provided for substitution of federal officials "on
motion or supplemental pleading filed .... showing a necessity for the survival" of the
action. See Caledonia Coal Co., v. Baker, 196 U.S. 432 (1905).
The 1925 Act, 43 Stat. 936, 941 (1925), provided for substitution of federal, state, and
local government officers upon a showing "that there is a substantial need for ... continuing
and maintaining the cause and obtaining an adjudication of the question involved." E.g., Ex
parte La Prade, 289 U.S. 444 (1933); Allen v. Regents of the University System of Georgia,
304 U.S. 439 (1938).
The 1925 Act later became the original rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 25.01. The Rule was amended in 1948 to alter the time
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mootness never arose, therefore, as a result of substitution under
these rules; if succession made the controversy moot, the plaintiff
would be unable to demonstrate a continuing need for the litigation
and substitution would be denied. Thus, even though substitution
was possible under the pre-1961 rules, if the plaintiff could not
demonstrate that the successor was continuing or threatening to
continue his predecessor's alleged misconduct, the litigation would
be dismissed. 9 As under Boutwell, the plaintiff thwarted by a succession would be unlikely to have his claim adjudicated until the
successor committed an overt act that re-invigorated the controversy.
B.

The 1961 Amendments to Rule 25(d) and Mootness

In 1961 rule 25(d) was amended to eliminate the abatement
doctrine as applied to government officers sued in their official capacity in federal courts." Specifically, the new rule provides for
automatic substitution of successors as defendants and deletes the
requirement of making a substantial showing of "need for. . . continuing and maintaining" the action. 1 To simplify the procedure of
substitution further, rule 25(d) (2) permits an action to describe the
officer by title instead of by name, unless the court requires that the
name be inserted. Although the amended rule assures that actions
against public officers will not abate by providing for automatic
substitution, the presence of the successor in court as a party defendant cannot require the court to continue to hear the case if a case
or controversy no longer exists. 22 The rule thus clearly shifts the
limit for moving for substitution, but the other provisions were left substantially unchanged.
See Johnson v. Yielding, 165 F. Supp. 76 (N.D. Ala. 1958).
Rule 25(d) was again amended in 1961. See text and notes at notes 21-34 infra.
"1 See, e.g., McGrath v. National Association of Manufacturers, 344 U.S. 804 (1952),
reviewed in Davis, Government Officers as Defendants: Two Troublesome Problems, 104 U.
PA. L. Rav. 69, 85 (1955); Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Wendell, 261 U.S. 1 (1923); Shaffer v. Howard,
249 U.S. 200 (1919).
20 The Advisory Committee on Rules's notes indicate that the Rule is intended to operate
in suits "in form against a named officer, but intrinsically against the government or the office
or the incumbent." The notes listed certain examples: to compel performance of official
duties, to obtain judicial review of official orders, to prevent officers from acting in excess of
their authority or unconstitutionally. Note, note 9 supra.
21 FED. R. Civ. P. 25(d) (1960). The Advisory Committee on Rules noted that
"[u]nder the Amendment, the successor is automatically substituted as a party without
an application or showing of need to continue the action." Note, note 9 supra.
12This point is made in Spomer, 414 U.S. at 521 n.9. The Supreme Court has based its
recent mootness decisions on the "case or controversy" requirement of article III of the
Constitution. An article III court lacks jurisdiction over a moot action because of the absence
of a "case or controversy." See Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV.
L. Rxv. 373, 375 (1974) (citing cases).

1975]

Mootness and F.R.C.P. 25(d)

court's attention from the propriety of substitution to the propriety
of continuing the litigation after substitution.
Since amended rule 25(d) magnifies the significance of the
mootness question and does not expressly allocate the burden of
proof, determining the proper allocation will be a central concern to
the litigants and the courts. Allocating the burden to the plaintiff
may result in duplicative litigation and may unnecessarily expose
the plaintiff to further harm. Allocating the burden to the successor,
on the other hand, may force him to defend the legality of conduct
that he does not intend to pursue and may force the court to render
an essentially advisory opinion. It is important, therefore, to determine if amended rule 25(d) was intended to allocate the burden of
establishing mootness, and if so, how.
Two points are clear: rule 25(d) cannot allocate the burden of
establishing mootness to one party in a given case or in general if
the relevant substantive law has allocated it to the other. Such a
change in the substantive law would be forbidden by the Rules
Enabling Act.2 Moreover, even if rule 25(d) were to allocate this
burden clearly, a court has the authority to dismiss a case sua
sponte on the ground of mootness; a case or controversy being crucial to a court's jurisdiction, the court can notice on its own motion
that its jurisdiction has ceased to exist because substitution has
4
mooted the case or controversy.
Although rule 25(d)'s allocation of the burden of establishing
mootness will not always be important-such as where there is a
clear absence of jurisdiction-it will be significant where in futuro
injunctive relief is sought against a successor government officer.
First, since mootness did not arise as an independent issue prior to
the 1961 amendments, rule 25(d) could allocate the mootness burden to either party without conflicting with established substantive
law. Second, since it generally will be difficult to predict whether
the successor intends to continue the contested policies of his predecessor, the mootness issue will rarely be sufficiently clear to warrant
In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) the Court noted that one purpose of the case or
controversy requirement is to "limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in
an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the
judicial process." Id. at 95. Although the issue that most commonly arises is whether the
plaintiff has a sufficient interest in the case to ensure the necessary adverseness, in substitution cases the question is whether the defendant has a sufficient interest in the case to ensure
adverseness.
' 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970); cf. Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
24 See Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
See generally 6A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcriCE
57.13, at 57-121 to 57-125 (2d ed. 1974);
Diamond, Federal Jurisdictionto Decide Moot Cases, 94 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 126 (1946).
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spontaneous judicial resolution; in any given case an examination
25
of the originally challenged behavior may well prove inconclusive.
Given this setting, several factors suggest that amended rule 25(d)
was intended to require the substituted successor to establish mootness as a general rule.
First, the Advisory Committee on Rules concluded that
amended rule 25(d) would place the burden of establishing mootness on the successor-defendant. Although the Committee's opinion
cannot be granted conclusive weight-as a practical matter, the
Committee's intent lacks the force of a legislature's-it certainly
merits considerable deference. 26 After observing that the requirement of a "showing that there is a substantial need for continuing
the litigation . . . can rarely serve any useful purpose and fastens
a burdensome formality," the Committee notes state:
When the successor does not intend to pursue the policy of his
predecessor which gave rise to the lawsuit, it will be open to
him, after substitution, . . .to seek to have the action dismissed as moot or to take other appropriate steps to avert a
28
judgment or decree.
This language led one commentator writing soon after the amendment was approved to conclude that rule 25(d) would henceforth
require the successor to establish mootness. 21 It also led Justice

2 But see Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514 (1974).
216
In Spomer, the Court relied on the Advisory Committee notes in construing the rule.

Note, note 9 supra.
28Id. The Committee Note then cites the following cases as being contrary to the principle of the amended rule, Ex parte La Prade, 289 U.S. 444 (1933); Allen v. Regents of the
University System of Georgia, 304 U.S. 439 (1938); McGrath v. National Association of
Manufacturers, 344 U.S. 804 (1952); Danenberg v. Cohen, 213 F.2d 944 (7th Cir. 1954). These
succession cases, decided under the pre-1961 substitution measures, required the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the controversy survived the succession as a condition for substitution.
2 Kaplan, Amendments of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,1961-1963 (I), 77 HARv.
L. REv. 601, 606-09 (1964). See also 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 25.09.
Professor Wright has argued, 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACrIcE AND
PROCEDURE, § 626, at 448-49 (C. Wright ed. 1961), cited with approval, Hirsh v. Green, 382
F. Supp. 187, 190 (D. Md. 1974), that the amended rule can only shift the burden of establishing mootness to successors in cases involving federal officers; the burden must remain unchanged in cases involving succession of state public officials. This argument is based on a
statement in Ex parte La Prade, 289 U.S. 444 (1933), a case disapproved by the Advisory
Committee on Rules, see note 28 supra, to the effect that even though a federal statute (such
as a substitution statute) could make a federal officer privy to the liabilities of his
predecessor-officers, it could not do so for state officers. Id. at 458. Wright's reliance on La
Prade is misplaced, however. Rule 25(d) does not make a successor a privy to the liabilities
of his predecessor; rather it enables a suit against a government officer to continue uninterrupted by a succession in office. In light of the purely procedural nature of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, it could scarcely be argued that a successor could be held liable for the
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Douglas to this conclusion. Justice Douglas's dissent from the Supreme Court's approval of rule 25(d) was based largely on his preference for the pre-amendment practice which, he claimed, implicitly
required the plaintiff to establish that the case had not been mooted
by succession." The majority of the Court did not quarrel with
Justice Douglas's conclusions as to how the rule would operate, but
simply noted their approval of the change."
The operation of the amended rule is also suggestive of an intent to burden the successor-defendant with establishing mootness.
If, under rule 25(d)(1) 2 the officer sued in his official capacity is
listed by name as the party defendant, the successor is to be automatically substituted as defendant upon taking office. Thus the
court need not become aware of the substitution. Moreover, rule
25(d)(2) 33 permits a public officer sued in his official capacity to be
described by his official title rather than by name unless the court
directs that his name be included.3 4 A succession in office is not apt
to come to the attention of the court under this provision as well.
Rule 25(d), it has been seen, expressly eliminates the abatement doctrine as well as the requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate a need for continuing the litigation. The rule replaces these
doctrines with an automatic rule of substitution designed to operate
without the knowledge of the court. Placing the burden of establishing mootness on the defendant would be entirely compatible with
the operation of the amended rule. Since the rule embodies an implicit judgment that succession and substitution have no bearing on
the existence of a continuing controversy, the successor who brings
the substitution to the court's attention should logically have the
burden of establishing its significance; in other words, the successor
should be required to demonstrate to the court that the substitution
that otherwise would have occurred without its knowledge has had
the effect of mooting the case or controversy.
personal liabilities of his predecessor. See text and notes at 23-25 supra. If rule 25(d) sought
to accomplish such a result, it would presumably be invalid in its application to all officers,
both state and federal. See 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 43.08, at 1360-61 (2d ed. 1974).
30 368 U.S. 1009, 1012 (1968).
31 368 U.S. 1009 (1961).
32See note 8 supra.

3 Id.
11See Elliott v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 233 F. Supp. 578, 590 (S.D. Cal. 1964),
rev'd on othergrounds, 386 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1968).
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1961

Spomer v. Littleton

5 was the first Supreme Court case since the
Spomer v. Littleton1
enactment of the 1961 amendments which was decided on the basis
of the mootness issue arising from a rule 25(d) substitution of party
defendant.3 6 Spomer was a civil rights class action brought against
Peyton Berbling, the then State's Attorney, alleging that he practiced racial discrimination in the exercise of his prosecutorial functions. The plaintiff class sought, inter alia, an in futuro injunction
prohibiting the continuation of that behavior. After the Seventh
Circuit held on appeal from the dismissal below that a prosecutor

does not enjoy absolute immunity from injunctive proscription,3 7 W.

C. Spomer was elected State's Attorney and succeeded Berbling.
Invoking the automatic substitution procedure of Supreme Court
rule 48(3), Spomer successfully petitioned for certiorari to review
38
the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Although the Supreme Court was aware of the substitution
when it granted certiorari on the question of the scope of prosecutorial immunity, it nonetheless resolved the case on mootness
grounds. Without having benefited from briefs of counsel on the
subject, the Court doubted that the case presented a concrete controversy between Spomer and respondents. The Court vacated the
Seventh Circuit's opinion and remanded the case to that court for
a determination of whether the case was in fact moot and whether
respondents should be permitted to amend their complaint.3 9 In
effect, the Court remanded to enable plaintiffs-respondents to attempt to show a need for continuing the litigation.
The intended scope of Justice White's opinion for the unanimous Court is exceedingly difficult to gauge, There is language in
the opinion which, if read literally, would completely undermine the
intent of the 1961 amendment. For example, the Court noted that
Spomer was neither named as a defendant nor was his conduct cited
in the complaint; yet the point of the recitation is unclear since this
situation will be the norm in a rule 25(d) substitution case. The
414 U.S. 514 (1974).
" Actually, the substitution in Spomer was pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 48(3), but,
as the Court noted, the wording of rule 48(3) was based on and is substantially identical to
rule 25(d). In fact, the Spomer Court relied on language from the Advisory Committee notes
to rule 25(d) in interpreting its rule. 414 U.S. at 521 n.9.
37 Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972).
411 U.S. 915 (1973).
3, 414 U.S. at 520-21.
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Court also observed that the claimants did not allege that "Spomer
intends to continue the asserted practices of Berbling of which they
complain."4 Rule 25(d), however, eliminated both the abatement
doctrine and the requirement of demonstrating a need to continue
the litigation; the Court's language arguably reinvigorates these
doctrines. Finally, in a footnote, the Court noted that the "automatic substitution" provision was intended to operate whenever
"effective relief would call for corrective behavior" by the successor
rather than the predecessor and that in applying this standard it is
necessary to determine if the controversy has survived the succession. 41 If, by this statement, the Court meant that a finding of mootness makes a case non-justiciable, it was saying nothing exceptional. But, on the other hand, if the Court was indicating that rule
25(d) substitution is to be conditioned upon the plaintiff showing
that the controversy will survive the substitution, it was for all
practical purposes rewriting the rule.
It is doubtful, however, that the Court disagreed with the Advisory Committee's assessment of the intent of rule 25(d) or believed
that rule 25(d) could not allocate the mootness burden to the successor; if it had, it presumably would have so stated. The Court must
have had something else in mind. The key to this otherwise mysterious opinion is perhaps contained in one sentence where the Court
hinted that the case did not truly involve "a claim against a government officer in his official capacity" within the meaning of the
substitution rule. The Court observed that "[t]he wrongful conduct charged in the complaint is personal to Berbling, despite the
fact that he was also sued in his then capacity as State's Attorney. ' 4 In other words, even though the Supreme Court had earlier
allowed substitution under a rule involving substitution of successors to officers sued in their official capacity, it had come to realize
that the alleged misconduct was probably personal and therefore
outside the area in which the rule's policies were intended to operate.
This reading of the case is supported by the otherwise paradoxical citation of Alien v. Regents of University System of Georgia43 for

the proposition that Spomer appeared moot because the complainants had not alleged facts indicating the continuation of the controversy after the succession. 44 Allen had been cited by the Rules AdviId. at 521.
, Id. at 521 n.41.
4 Id. at 521.
304 U.S. 439 (1938).
" 414 U.S. at 521.
"
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sory Committee as a case contrary to the spirit of amended rule
25(d)4 5 since it required the plaintiff to establish a need for continuing the litigation. Its citation in Spomer, as well as the Court's other
observations, would be explicable only if, on its facts, Spomer was
outside the area in which rule 25(d) was intended to allocate the
burden of establishing mootness to the successor. In other words,
Spomer is reasonable if the underlying claim in the case is viewed
as being only nominally against a government officer in his official
capacity while in reality being against the officer in his personal
capacity. Under this reading, Spomer would create a novel category
of behavior-personal official action. Certain official-appearing actions would be considered to be too "personal" for rule 25(d) purposes in the absence of allegations that the actions complained of
were in fact official policies not personal to the predecessor.
If correct, this reading of Spomer is troublesome because there
is a wide range of governmental activity that could conceivably be
characterized as "personal official action." In one sense it could be
argued that all official action by a public officer is "personal" since
it is his individual responses to the duties he undertook when he
assumed office.4" Under this view, however, the exception would
swallow the rule. On the other hand, Spomer might be read as
contemplating a distinction between ministerial and discretionary
action, since only the latter involves the exercise of subjective and
therefore personal judgment. Yet this standard may also be unworkable, posing hopeless problems of linedrawing and conceptualization.47 Moreover, a discretionary decision can, if exercised consistently, become an official policy. Finally, Spomer might be read as
contemplating a general distinction between those actions of an
officer that bespeak an official policy and those that do not. Although this standard would nesessarily be ambiguous as well, "nonpersonal" or "official" conduct within the scope of rule 25(d) could
be defined as conduct involving a reasonable probability of repetition.48 There is no point in continuing the litigation if the predecessor's behavior appears to be unique or so idiosyncratic that it is
unlikely to be repeated by the successor. Otherwise, official action
4' See note 28 supra.
"
The Supreme Court basically adopted this position in United States v. Boutwell, 84
U.S. (17 Wall.) 604 (1873).
" Professor Davis, for example, concluded that the ministerial/discretionary distinction
has "no affirmative justification" and has proven "unworkable in the context of actions for
writs of mandamus." K. DAvIs, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW, CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 167 (1973).
41 See text and notes at note 88-100 infra.
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should be considered to be official and the substitution should not
affect the litigation.
Since the Spomer decision does not disclose the breadth of the
exception it announces, it is necessary to look at other authorities
to determine when a plaintiff seeking in futuro injunctive relief
against a successor government official must demonstrate that the
controversy has survived the succession. 49 A finding of mootness, it
must be remembered, does not conclusively deny the plaintiff's requested relief; but it does require the entire proceedings to be vacated, thus forcing the plaintiff to wait for either a threat or an
additional harmful act before beginning the litigation anew. Both
practicality and policy suggest that Spomer should be read as creating only a narrow exception to the general rule placing the burden
of establishing mootness on the successor-defendant. There is some
indication that the lower courts have already begun to give Spomer
0
such a narrow reading.

B. Lower Court Succession Cases After Spomer
The lower courts have been confronted with the mootness issue
arising from a rule 25(d) substitution on several occasions since
Spomer was decided. Although these cases do not, when taken as a
whole, precisely delineate the circumstances in which the plaintiff
will be obligated to establish non-mootness, they do suggest a tendency to read Spomer narrowly, placing the burden on the plaintiff
only where the original defendant's conduct was clearly based on a
personal rather than an official policy.
In a small number of cases, as in Spomer, courts acting on their
own motion have been able to conclude with ease that a case has
been mooted by an official succession. In SafeguardMutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Pennsylvania,51 a suit for injunctive and declaratory relief, it
was alleged that the Insurance Commissioner, George F. Reed,
"through his authorized agents, . . . unlawfully and maliciously

used various provisions of the Insurance Acts in an effort to circumvent an order of the Dauphin County Court.

.

." in order to injure

the plaintiff.52 Following the appointment and substitution of a new
Commissioner during the pendency of the litigation, the court, after
" The irreparable harm necessary to support an injunctive order should not be confused
with whether the controversy has become moot. It is quite possible that the litigation after
the substitution will demonstrate that the injunction should not issue.
'
See text and notes at notes 51-74 infra.
5'372 F. Supp. 939, 946, 948-49 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
52 Id. at 944.
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discussing Spomer extensively, held the action for injunctive relief
moot; the court noted that the wrongful conduct challenged was
personal to the predecessor and that no allegations had been made
that the successor was engaged in similar misconduct. 3 A similar
case, Lusk v. McDonough,54 was an action seeking declaratory relief
from the informal rule of defendant state judge forbidding courtroom appearances by women wearing slacks. The action was held
to have been mooted by_ the defendant's separation from office.
Again, as in Safeguard, the court emphasized the personal character of the alleged misconduct and the failure to assert a threat of
repetition by the successor."
Both Safeguard and McDonough were straightforward cases
falling squarely within the narrow confines of Spomer; in each case
the court could easily conclude that the alleged misconduct-a malicious abuse of authority in the one case and an idiosyncratic informal rule in the other-was so personal that there was virtually no
likelihood of repetition by the successors. Since the likelihood of a
continued controversy was virtually nonexistent, the courts
recognized their clear lack of jurisdiction and held the cases moot
on their own motion 6
In most of the cases since Spomer, however, a full hearing on
the merits has followed the automatic substitution, although the
opinions rarely include a careful discussion of the mootness ques57
tion. Typical of these cases is Cabrerav. Municipality of Bayamon,
in which the court summarily concluded that Spomer was "different, not merely distinguishable." ' 8 Cabrera was a class action by
town residents seeking to enjoin the municipality, the Mayor and
the Head of the Municipal Dumps Operation System from continuing to operate a dump near their land. The district court issued the
0 Id. at 948-49. Plaintiff also sought reinstatement of his insurance license. The court
held, without relying on Spomer, that this aspect of the case was also moot because plaintiff
had already been reinstated by the state court. Id. at 949. Had plaintiff not been reinstated,
the court may have been willing to recognize the existence of a continuing controversy despite
the succession. See text and notes at notes 57-64 infra.
" 386 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
mId. at 186 n.2. See also Hirsh v. Green, 382 F. Supp. 187 (D. Md. 1974). In Hirsh, the
court arguably misapplied Spomer in holding that an action by a discharged employee
against two state officials for declaratory relief from his allegedly unlawful and unconstitutional dismissal became moot when the two named officials were succeeded. This case is not
germane to the analysis, however, because the successors were the ones who moved to have
the suit declared moot.
56 See text and note at note 25 supra.
370 F. Supp. 859 (D.P.R. 1974).
Id. at 871.
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injunction even though both named defendants had been succeeded
prior to its issuance." The court decided that Spomer did not foreclose it from requiring the successors to take affirmative steps to
abate the pollution,"0 intimating that the finding of mootness in
Spomer was based on the Supreme Court's reluctance to reach the
merits.6
Although the court did not suggest any explanation for its result, Cabrera is characteristic of quite a few cases decided under
amended rule 25(d) in which mandatory injunctive relief from a
current and continuing injury is sought." The issue in these cases
is whether the successor will be allowed to permit the effects of the
predecessor's alleged misconduct to harm the plaintiff. 3 Such cases
can hardly come within Spomer, despite the theoretical uncertainty
concerning the successor's future action, because the ongoing harm
is itself the basis of a continuing controversy between the parties."
Requiring the plaintiff to supplement his proof would serve no purpose.
In several other substitution cases involving behavior similar to
the conduct challenged in Spomer, mootness has not been found
where the conduct was apparently based on an official and longstanding policy. Pattersonv. McDougall," for example, involved a
pro se complaint filed by inmates of a Georgia prison against the
Director of the Georgia State Board of Corrections seeking to enjoin
the continuation of an alleged tradition of brutal mistreatment,
racial and religious discrimination and deprivation of various con" The opinion does not clearly specify whether the succession occurred during the trial
or in the period after the trial ended but before the decree issued. Id. at 871.
0 Id. at 870. The dump had grown so large that affirmative corrective measures were
necessary to prevent further damage to nearby properties.
" Id. at 871-72.
12 E.g., Lucas v. Gardner, 453 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1972); Alcoa Steamship
Co. v. Perez,
424 F.2d 433 (1st Cir. 1970); Vermont v. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. 606 (D. Vt. 1974); Adamian
v. University of Nebraska, 359 F. Supp. 825 (D. Nev. 1973); City of New York v. Ruckelshaus,
358 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973); Moore v. Knowles, 333 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Tex. 1971), affd
inpartand vacatedinpart on othergrounds, 482 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1973); Spivac v. Gardner,
268 F. Supp. 366 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); Hudson v. Celebrezze, 220 F. Supp. 738 (E.D.N.C. 1963).
0 A finding of mootness would not necessarily turn on whether the relief sought was
mandatory rather than prohibitory since mandatory relief is often sought to assist enforcement of an essentially preventive decree.
" This conclusion assumes, of course, that the plaintiff's right to reparative relief survives the succession in office. Cf. Sarteschi v. Burlein, 508 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1975). Compare
Moore v. Knowles, 333 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (wrongful dismissal action not mooted
by change-over in composition of defendant Board of Trustees), with Hirsh v. Green, 382 F.
Supp. 187 (D. Md. 1974), (wrongful dismissal action moot when defendant-officers at whose
sufferance plaintiff served left office).
" 506 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1975).
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stitutional rights. After the district court had dismissed the complaint on technical grounds, the named defendant was succeeded;
the court of appeals reviewed the merits of the dismissal in spite of
the succession and found the dismissal improper. Although the successor had not moved to declare the case moot, the remand order
nonetheless included an instruction to the district court to examine
the mootness question raised by the succession. The court of appeals
doubted, however, that the case was moot under Spomer because
"[here] the wrongdoing is alleged to permeate many levels of
prison personnel, and, if proved, would likely require relief to correct
institutionalized abuses."6 6 The challenged conduct was further described as "pervasive and long-continued."6 7
Even though acts of racial discrimination were held to be "personal" in Spomer, Patterson appears to stand for the proposition
that such presumptively personal misconduct will, for mootness
purposes, be considered "official" if part of a pervasive tradition of
such misconduct. 8 A court could readily assume that such longstanding institutional practice is likely to be continued by the successor. If the successor desires to reverse the contested policy, it
seems less burdensome to require him to disavow the policy rather
than to subject the plaintiff to the possibility of further harm. If he
does not, there is no reason to delay a decision on the merits. Numerous decisions predating Spomer appear to support this view. 9
Spomer also has not controlled in cases where the successor is
called upon to perform an essentially ministerial act and thus is only
a nominal defendant. Ford v. Hollowell,70 for example, was a proceeding against the Superintendent of the Mississippi State Penitentiary for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed that his
conviction was invalid because it had allegedly been based on an
indictment of a grand jury from which blacks were systematically
16506 F.2d at 6 n.5. In Spomer, the Court noted that the question of whether "effective
relief would call for corrective behavior" by the successor was important in determining
whether the controversy survived the succession.
' Id. at 3.
" See text and note at note 40 supra.
"
See, e.g., Barnett v. Rogers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lankford v. Gelston, 364
F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966); United States v. Logue, 344 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1965); United States
v. Atkins, 323 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Dothard, 373 F. Supp. 504 (M.D.
Ala.), aff'd sub nom., NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); NAACP v. Allen, 340
F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Coleman v. Aycock, 304 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Lee
v. Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967). See also Roberts v. Taylor, 390 F.
Supp. 705 (D.R.I. 1975).
70 385 F. Supp. 1392 (N.D. Miss. 1974). For a similar case, see Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp.
1287 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
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excluded. Despite a succession in the office of Superintendent, the
court reached the merits without discussing either Spomer in particular or mootness in general. But the court's silence may have an
explanation. Since the successor never argued that the case was
moot, dismissal for mootness would have been proper, under the
suggested reading of Spomer, only if the court were certain that the
succession had deprived it of jurisdiction. The court in Hollowell
could not make such a finding; although the predecessor had not
personally perpetrated the alleged wrongful behavior, the successor
was the official capable of granting the desired relief. For the purposes of correcting the wrong, it did not matter whether the predecessor or the successor was the current office holder and therefore
71
the nominal defendant.
In a final category of cases, the courts have reached the merits
after substitution without pausing to examine mootness despite the
personal nature of the underlying behavior. These cases involve
attempts to disturb the exercise of the defendant's prosecutorial
discretion, an area of behavior that would, especially after Spomer,
appear to be highly personal. Yet an action to enjoin the Attorney
General and the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia to exercise their discretion to initiate prosecutions under the seldom enforced 1925 Federal Corrupt Practices Act was not found to have
72
been mooted by succession in Nader v. Saxbe.
It is peculiar that the court in Nader v. Saxbe did not trouble
to distinguish its case from Spomer, the misconduct in both cases
involving alleged improprieties in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. There are logical grounds on which the cases might be dis7, In a sense, a habeas corpus case is not a suit for injunctive relief in futuro but is an
action to remedy the continuing injury of unconstitutional imprisonment; it should therefore
be outside of Spomer on this ground as well. For examples of pre-Spomer cases against
nominal defendants called upon to perform essentially ministerial tasks which were held not
to have been mooted by succession, see Smith v. Cherry, 489 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1973) (suit
to void an election); Aikens v. Gomes, 367 F. Supp. 401 (D. Ariz. 1972); Sims v. Amos, 336
F. Supp. 924 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (reapportionment).
72 497 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Similarly, an action to enjoin the Secretary of the
Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services from enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional state statute survived a substitution in Owens v. Roberts, 377 F. Supp. 45 (M.D.
Fla. 1974). It is easier to understand why the Owens case was not mooted by the succession
than it is in Saxbe. The underlying complaint in Saxbe was that the predecessors had abused
their prosecutorial discretion; such abuse is not readily attributable to the successors. In
Owens, on the other hand, the underlying complaint was that the statute being enforced was
unconstitutional; the merits of this complaint were not at all dependent upon the identity of
the nominal defendant.
For similar pre-Spomer cases, see, e.g., Vermont v. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. 606 (D. Vt.
1974); Carlson v. Schlesinger, 364 F. Supp. 626 (D.D.C. 1973); City of New York v. Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973); Jenness v. Forbes, 351 F. Supp. 88 (D.R.I. 1972).
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tinguished, but the court chose not to mention them. For example,
in Spomer the alleged misconduct was malicious and not alleged to
be part of a long-standing tradition; it was relatively unlikely that
it would be continued by the successor. In Saxbe, on the other hand,
the alleged misconduct was traditional and pervasive; the court
could have assumed that it would be likely to be repeated if the
successor was unwilling to disavow it. In any event, cases such as
Saxbe demonstrate the strong tendency of the lower courts to con73
fine Spomer to its precise facts, by brute force if necessary.
Other than in cases of continuing harm or where the officer is
only a nominal defendant, the lower courts have not yet articulated
clear standards for determining when Spomer will require a plaintiff
seeking an injunction in futuro against a government officer in his
official capacity to demonstrate that the action has not been mooted
by a succession in office. The cases suggest, however, that the courts
have implicitly been applying Spomer in one of two ways. First, the
cases could be read only as establishing that in certain defined
circumstances the plaintiff will not be burdened with establishing
non-mootness. Other situations are presumably to be analyzed on
a case-by-case basis. Such a reading, however, leaves certain questions unanswered: Does Spomer represent the exception, or is it the
rule? How does a court determine whether to follow Spomer in any
given case? If Spomer is applied, how does a court establish what
the plaintiff must do in order to continue the case? It would thus
seem necessary, in the absence of a principal rule, to decide the
unsettled cases on the basis of a somewhat mysterious and ad hoc
examination of the facts involved.
Second, it could be argued that the cases, when taken as a
whole, establish a straightforward procedural rule: unless, as in
Spomer, the court is so confident that the successor will not continue the predecessor's behavior-in other words, that the predecessor's behavior was "personal," however that term is defined-the
court will proceed to the merits unless the successor affirmatively
establishes the case is moot. Such a procedure would not unduly
" The Saxbe and Owens courts might have been mindful that a broad reading of Spomer
would reinvigorate Ex parte La Prade, 289 U.S. 444 (1933), a case which the Advisory Committee Notes expressly disapproved, see note 28 supra. In Ex parte La Prade the Supreme
Court held that an action seeking to enjoin a state attorney general from enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional statute was mooted upon the incumbent's separation from office. The
Court noted that the successor might not follow the predecessor's personal policy and might,
in other words, refuse to enforce the law. See Allen v. Regents of the University System of
Georgia, 304 U.S. 439 (1938). See also Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley,
366 U.S. 582, 588 (1961).
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conflict with rule 25(d)'s general principle of requiring the successor
affirmatively to establish mootness. That policy would be sacrificed
only in the rare cases where the court was certain that the successor
was unlikely to continue the contested policies; in such cases the
plaintiff would be unlikely to be prejudiced by the finding of mootness. In the great majority of cases, the successor would either assent to continuing the litigation or attempt to establish mootness.
Although this rule would be defensible in light of the policies of
amended rule 25(d),7 4 the courts have not expressly purported to

follow it.
III.

RELATED DOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES

Outside the context of a rule 25(d) substitution, settled rules
determine when a successor is bound by an injunction issued against
his predecessor and when a defendant in an action for injunctive
relief can moot the action by alleging that the challenged conduct
will not be repeated. An examination of these rules and the policies
that underlie them suggests the propriety of generally requiring a
rule 25(d) successor to establish mootness if he wishes to avoid
continuation of the litigation.
A.

The Obligation of Successors to Honor Injunctions Issued
Against Their Predecessors

At common law, an injunction was binding not only against its
specific addressee, but also against privies of the addressee who had
notice of the decree . 7 The concept of privity has been used to define
the class of persons who, although not parties to the proceeding in
which the decree was issued, will be bound by the decree because
their interests in the matter are closely related to those of the
addressee. If only the addressee himself were bound, he could easily
See text and notes at notes 27-33 supra.
require the courts to undertake the unwieldy task of
determining when behavior is likely to be continued by a successor. Since the presumption
is that the behavior will be continued in all but the unusual cases, the successor will bear
the burden of going forward to establish that the behavior will not be repeated. If the court
is not certain that the behavior is unlikely to be repeated and the successor does not attempt
to go forward, the litigation will not be interrupted by the substitution. To combat a successful demonstration, the plaintiff should be entitled to supplement his pleadings to show, for
example, that the predecessor's policies were not original with him but were based on a longstanding official tradition.
11See Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945); United States v. Dean Rubber
Mfg. Co., 71 F. Supp. 96, 98 (W.D. Mo. 1946). See generally 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
1 65.13 at 110 (2d ed. 1974).
7'

11Such a rule would not, moreover,
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circumvent the injunction by having others act on his behalf.77
Thus, an agent of the addressee who knowingly transgresses the
injunction 78 or a non-agent who knowingly aids and abets a violation
of the decree79 will be held to be in contempt of court.
The policy of ensuring the integrity of injunctive decrees does
not necessarily require that successor officers be bound by their
predecessor's injunctions. If the successor was not appointed in
order to thwart the decree, it could be argued that he should not be
held to be a privy. 0 Yet in two older cases, the Supreme Court held
that successors were required to honor injunctions that had been
issued against their predecessors, even though the successors had
evidently been appointed in good faith." The Court reasoned that
since the original relief ran against the office of the successor, the
successor could not have independent justification for engaging in
2
the proscribed behavior.
This doctrine has persisted to the present; several recent federal
cases have held that successors are bound by final injunctions addressed to their predecessors 3 subject to the right to attempt to
modify or dissolve the decree in equity." In Lucy v. Adams, 5 for
example, the successor of a Dean of Admissions at the University
of Alabama sought construction of an injunction issued to his predecessor. The predecessor had been enjoined from pursuing an admissions policy based on racial discrimination. After commenting on
the strong identity of interest between the predecessor and the successor, the court expressed fear that the original decree would be
thwarted if the successor were not bound, even though it had not
found that the successor had been appointed to circumvent the
order. 8 The court held that the decree would bind the new Dean as
See, e.g., Crucia v. Behrman, 147 La. 137, 84 So. 523 (1920).
7 Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 170 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1948); Helena
Glendale Ferry Co. v. Walling, 132 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1942).
"' Chase Nat'l Bank v. City of Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431 (1934); McGraw-Edison Co. v.
Preformed Line Prods. Co., 362 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1966).
Cf. Note, BindingNon-parties to Injunction Decrees, 49 MiNN. L. R.Ev. 719, 728 (1965).
s Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line, 200 U.S. 273 (1906); Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537 (1903).
'1 See Note, supra note 80, at 728.
Lucy v. Adams, 224 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ala. 1963), aff'd sub nom., McCorvey v. Lucy,
328 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1964); Wright v. County School Board, 309 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Va.
1970), rev'd sub nom., Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 442 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971),
rev'd, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
9 Acheson v. Albert, 195 F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1952); see note 87 infra. See also cases cited
in note 83 supra; 6B J. MooRE, supra note 76, 60.26(4) (2d ed. 1974).
224 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ala. 1963).
The court evidently concluded that Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d) incorporates the common law
rule concerning the obligation of successors to addressees of injunctions. Rule 65(d) states:
"
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well as all other university officials with knowledge of it. In essence,
the entire Admissions Office was held to be bound by the original
injunction.
The principle of the Lucy case serves to protect not only the
plaintiff's established rights but also the court's resources. The
plaintiff is not required to go through a potentially endless stream
of litigation to prevent future office holders from engaging in behavior that he has once established to be wrongful. Similarly, the court
is not required to hear essentially the same case over and over again,
a redundancy that the principle of res judicata prevents in cases
involving the same parties. The Lucy doctrine does not, moreover,
operate to the undue prejudice of the successor since the injunction
can be equitably dissolved upon a proper showing."
Although the Lucy doctrine is firmly rooted in the law, it is not
directly controlling where the successor takes office before the injunctive decree is issued. Nevertheless, the policy underlying the
doctrine suggests that it is proper in those cases to require the successor either to disavow the contested policy or defend its lawfulness. Just as the mere fact of succession is an insufficient reason for
a court to emasculate an injunction issued against the predecessor
officer in his official capacity, the substitution of a successor officer
during such litigation should also be an insufficient reason in and
of itself for the court to assume that the pending action has become
moot if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate otherwise. In either case,
the identity of the interests and the likelihood of continuity in policy
call for analogous results: if the injunction has issued, the successor
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order. . . is binding only upon
the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and
upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice
of the order by personal service or otherwise.
See cases cited in note 76 supra.
" It is interesting that in Spomer the successor was not required to defend the legality
of the predecessor's racial discrimination whereas in Lucy the successor was held to be bound
by a decree prohibiting the predecessor from continuing his discrimination.
It is well settled that an injunction governing a continuous course of conduct may be
modified or dissolved in equity if circumstances unforeseen when the decree issued make
application of the injunction to the unforeseen circumstances a hardship. FED. R. Civ. P.
60(b); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932); Western Union Tel. Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 133 F.2d 955 (7th Cir. 1943); see Developments in the Law-

Injunctions,78 HA.v. L. REv. 994 (1965); Note, The Power of a Court to Modify a FinalPermanent Injunction, 46 MICH. L. REv. 241 (1947).
A credible change in the attitude of the addressee may also justify modification or
dissolution of the decree. Tobin v. Little Rock Packing Co., 202 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1953);
Tobin v. Alma Mills, 192 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1951); Comment, Dissolutionand Modification
of FederalDecrees on Grounds of Change of Attitude, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 659 (1958); 11 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2961, at 606-07.
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should be bound; if the injunction has only been sought, the successor should defend.
B.

Voluntary Cessation and the Discontinuance Doctrine

One of the issues addressed by the Supreme Court in United
States v. W.T. Grant Co.8" was whether the defendant's voluntary
cessation of the behavior challenged in a case for injunctive relief
would constitute a sufficient reason to find the case moot. The Government had sought to enjoin an individual under the Clayton Act
from serving as a director of the boards of certain competing corporations. In an attempt to moot the action, the individual defendant
resigned a sufficient number of his memberships to eradicate the
conflict and promised never to resume those memberships. The
Court refused to view the case as moot, remarking that the defendant had not met the "heavy" 8 9 burden of demonstrating that
"there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.""0 Since W.T. Grant, it has become well established that,
in the absence of external factors that make repetition of the challenged conduct unlikely,9' voluntary cessation will moot an action
only if the defendant admits the illegality of his conduct in addition
92
to his promise not to repeat it.
- 345 U.S. 629 (1953). See also United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S.
326 (1952); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 447 F.2d 945 (7th Cir.
1971).
89 345 U.S. at 633. See also Walling v.-Mutual Wholesale Food & Supply Co., 141 F.2d
331, 334 (8th Cir. 1944).
90 The Court refused to grant the injunction, however. It stated that injunctive relief
required "some cognizable danger" of repetition-"something more than the mere possibility
which serves to keep the case alive." 345 U.S. at 633 (emphasis supplied).
11 Compare SEC v. Medical Comm. on Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403 (1972), with United
States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199 (1968). See also text and note
at note 94 infra.
92 See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Co., 166 U.S. 290, 308 (1897);
Walling v. Helmerick & Payne, 323 U.S. 37, 43 (1944); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416, 448 (2d Cir. 1946); Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v.
Veterans Administration, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971); Cherry v. Postmaster General, 332 F.
Supp. 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1972).
Although it has been suggested that an admission of illegality might be insufficient to
moot the action, Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARv. L. REv. 373,
384 (1974), the weight to be accorded an admission is likely to depend on such factors as the
character of the past misconduct, and the ability of the defendant to control repetition of the
behavior, particularly where government officers are defendants. Compare Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966), and United States v. Atkins, 323 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1963),
with Cherry v. Postmaster General, 332 F. Supp. 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1063
(2d Cir. 1972), and United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Pa.
1965).
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Two closely related policies underlie the so-called discontinuance doctrine: preservation of judicial resources and protection of
the plaintiff's interests. 3 If-the litigation has approached completion before the defendant's recantation, a finding of mootness would
possibly compel an unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources in
the future to retry the issue. A person who is unwilling to defend the
legality of his contested behavior or admit its illegality can logically
be presumed likely to repeat it. On the other hand, a court would
have less reason to fear that its resources would be wasted if the
recantation were coupled with an admission of illegality; a person
would be unlikely, and probably foolish, to resume conduct that he
has freely admitted to be illegal. Without tangible assurance that
repetition is unlikely,94 judicial economy is best served by early
litigation, regardless of its eventual outcome.
The discontinuance doctrine also protects the interests of the
plaintiff. If voluntary cessation were to moot these cases, the plaintiff would be forced to endure more harm or the threat of more harm
before being entitled to attempt to demonstrate that he is entitled
to injunctive protection. 5 A plaintiff who has alleged to have already suffered legal prejudice should be able to have his claim adju" See Kates & Barker, Mootness in Judicial Proceedings, 62 CAUF. L. Rzv. 1385, 1413
(1974):
If the dispute is sufficiently likely to recur ... judicial economy will be served by a
decision that will forestall future litigation. Moreover decision of a case which is likely
to recur better protects the rights of victims than a decision delayed until harm has again
recurred.
See also Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARv. L. REV. 373, 388
(1974); Note, Mootness onAppeal in the Supreme Court, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1672, 1675 (1970).
'"
A defendant may also establish mootness by persuading the court that changed circumstances make repetition of the challenged conduct exceedingly unlikely. In United States
v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199 (1968), the Court rejected such a claim
and remanded the case for a determination of whether the injunction should issue. The
defendant association argued that a change in the regulations of the Agency for International
Development made the continued existence of the association uneconomical, but the Court
held that the "stringent standard" for establishing mootness had not been met because there
was a "reasonable possibility" that the member companies would re-organize in another
form. Id. at 203. See also Barnett v. Rogers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Jackson v. Bishop,
404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Anderson v. City of Albany, 321 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963); City
of Montgomery v. Gilmore, 277 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1960); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The stringent standard for establishing mootness in
these cases is entirely appropriate: neither the plaintiff nor the judicial system should be
exposed to the possibility of a renewal of the alleged misconduct if the defendant is not willing
to admit the illegality of his actions and cannot persuasively demonstrate that external forces
would prevent him from repeating the conduct even if he tried.
" See text and note at note 87 supra. The plaintiff's interests may be best served by
immediate litigation even if he is unable to prevail eventually on the merits; in that case the
plaintiff may be better off if he is forced to adjust to the reality of the legality of the defendant's behavior immediately rather than later.
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dicated without unnecessary delay. Moreover, it is difficult to conclude that the discontinuance doctrine prejudices the defendant
even if he were to be enjoined from engaging in behavior he sincerely
intended to abandon." Although the defendant would have to absorb litigation expenses to defend such a suit, such prejudice seems
insignificant when it is recalled that it was his alleged misconduct
that generated the lawsuit in the first place; the legal system generally requires an individual to defend his actions at his own expense.
However, because the voluntary cessation cases resolve the
mootness issue on the basis of the likelihood of repetition of the
challenged behavior by the one originally engaged in it, the doctrine
could be viewed as having only limited applicability in succession
cases where the successor has an unblemished record. But here
again, the policy underlying the doctrine-that a case should not be
found moot when there is a reasonable likelihood of recurrence of
the challenged behavior-can be applied in full force. The fact the
the successor has an as yet unblemished record does not alter the
relevant inquiry-whether the behavior is likely to be repeated-although it should enable the successor to moot the case
through voluntary cessation with greater ease.9" A finding of mootness is not warranted if there is a reasonable likelihood that the
challenged conduct will be repeated. In Spomer the Court could
reasonably conclude that the successor was not apt to continue the
predecessor's personal policy of racial malice; a finding of mootness
was therefore reasonable. In most of the lower court cases, however,
such a finding could not be made and the courts quite properly
reached the merits after noting the substitution.
CONCLUSION

Since a moot case is not a "case or controversy" within the
meaning of article III, section 2 of the Constitution, a federal court
has no jurisdiction to decide it. It is not always readily apparent,
however, whether a case is moot or not. In particular, it is exceptionally difficult to ascertain whether a case in which in futuro injunc96This argument was made in NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 179 F.2d 221, 222 (2d Cir.
1950), cited with approval in United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953); see
Kates & Barker, supra note 93, at 1414-15. At 1415 n.167 the authors quote from Vaughan v.
John C. Winston Co., 83 F.2d 370, 374 (10th Cir. 1936):
If, except for the injunction, Vaughan would have continued to send out the defamatory
circulars then the order concededly was proper; if he did not so intend, then he is not
hurt by the order. His appeal from that part of the order indicates that it hurts; but it
can only hurt if he desires to resume his unlawful acts.
g1 See text and notes at notes 99-100 infra.
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Mootness and F.R.C.P. 25(d)

tive relief is sought against a government officer in his official capacity is mooted when his successor is substituted under the automatic
procedure of rule 25(d) of -the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Given the difficulty of accurately predicting the successor's future
actions, the choice of presumption in this situation-mootness or
non-mootness-and the corresponding allocation of the burden of
overcoming the presumption may often be dispositive.
Several practical factors suggest that the burden of demonstrating mootness should generally be on the successor. First, in
acceding to the predecessor's office, the successor inherits the predecessor's duties, powers, objectives, and, quite possibly, priorities as
well. This strong identity of interests will often generate a consistency in official behavior and attitude that overlaps separate tenures. Moreover, if, in light of this strong identity, the successor does
not argue that the contested conduct was personal to the predecessor and thus that the case has become moot, it seems reasonable to
assume that he will continue the behavior. Second, a finding of
mootness will give the successor a grace period in which he can
continue his predecessor's challenged policies without fear of sanction; this grace period exposes the plaintiff to further harm of the
nature he has already attempted to challenge. Third, as a matter
of practicality it will be much easier for the successor to establish
mootness by disavowing the contested policy than it will be for the
plaintiff to establish non-mootness by demonstrating a continuation
or threat of continuation of the challenged conduct. A successor may
be able to avoid judicial review of the contested policies for quite
some time while permitting the cloud of possible resumption to
hang over the plaintiff's head. Finally, judicial economy is not well
served by dismissing litigation that is in progress when there is a
likelihood that the proceedings will eventually have to be repeated.
The relevant legal factors also suggest the propriety of presuming that an action has not been mooted by substitution. Rule 25(d),
when viewed in light of the Advisory Committee's notes, seems
intended to burden the successor with establishing mootness after
substitution. Furthermore, the policies of the Lucy doctrine and the
discontinuance doctrine-preservation of the plaintiff's interests in
achieving a binding resolution on the merits and efficient use of
judicial resources-also call for burdening the successor.
In Spomer and a handful of cases decided directly under it, the
courts have departed, however, from the principle of requiring the
defendant to establish non-mootness. Since the Spomer Court in all
probability did not intend to re-establish the practice of requiring
plaintiffs to establish non-mootness, it is important to determine
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when Spomer shifts the burden to the plaintiff. If Spomer is to
remain the exception instead of becoming the rule, a court should
shift the burden to the plaintiff only when convinced that the predecessor's policy was so personal that the successor would be unlikely to repeat the wrongful actions. The successor should bear the
burden of establishing mootness in all but the rare cases where the
court is confident that the substitution has certainly mooted the
action. This rule would not seriously conflict with the policies of
amended rule 25(d)-the burden would be on the successor in
most cases-and would comport with the policies of the Lucy and
discontinuance doctrines; the plaintiff would be required to establish non-mootness only where it seemed certain that neither the
legal system nor the plaintiff would suffer as a result.
Finally, if the successor will typically bear the burden of establishing mootness, it is important to determine what he must do to
perform that task. In the voluntary cessation cases, the courts have
tended to require more than a statement of intent not to continue
the challenged behavior, and have at times sought a confession of
illegality or a demonstration of compelling external circumstances
as additional requirements. 8 Yet in cases where a government official offers to discontinue his challenged behavior, the courts appear
to be satisfied with an apparently good faith disavQwal5 5 Importing
this lesser standard of proof seems entirely appropriate where the
successor offers to discontinue his predecessor's behavior. Since the
identity of interest between the successor and the predecessor is not
absolute and the successor has as yet done no wrong, the court
should have little reason to fear that the disavowal is a sham.100
Arthur F. Sampson III
E.g., United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953); see text and notes at notes
88-97 supra; cf. United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199 (1968);
Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REv. 373, 384 (1974).
11Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 436 F.2d 1363
(2d Cir. 1971); Belknap v. Leary, 427 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1970); Cherry v. Postmaster General,
332 F. Supp. 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), afl'd, 460 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1972); United States ex rel.
Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
"I See, e.g., Four Star Publications, Inc. v. Erbe, 304 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1962).
The court may wish to vary the burden in accordance with the circumstances. Where
the challenged policy is government-wide and has persisted through several successions, a
good faith disavowal may be insufficient. See, e.g., United States v. Atkins, 323 F.2d 733 (5th
Cir. 1963). The successor should not be able to shift the burden to the plaintiff by merely
alleging his belief that the predecessor's alleged misconduct was personal under Spomer and
therefore not attributable to him but otherwise refusing to disavow the policy. 'the court
would not have been willing to conclude on its own motion that the challenged conduct was
so personal as to moot the case, then the successor should be required either to disavow or
defend. The successor's statement of belief should not by itself be sufficient to persuade a
court that the challenged conduct was not likely to.be repeated.

